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IN THE HOT HOUSE: WILL CANADA’S WTO 
CHALLENGE SLAUGHTER U.S. COOL 
REGULATIONS? 
INTRODUCTION 
t has been a long time coming, but when you enter your grocery 
store these days, you might be able to figure out where your meat 
came from.1 The United States Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA”) 
mandatory Country-of-Origin Labeling (“COOL”) system requires retail 
labels on muscle cuts and ground beef, lamb, goat, pork, and chicken, 
among other things.2 COOL is intended to provide consumers with in-
formation about the origin of their purchases.3 
Origin labeling is common to many products we buy. It is a reflection 
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1304), that requires, 
unless otherwise specified, the origin of all imports to be conspicuously 
labeled.4 Consumers are probably familiar with such labels on things like 
cars and clothes.5 Prior to COOL, many agricultural products were ex-
empt or became products of the U.S. through additional manufacturing or 
                                                                                                             
 1. News Release No. 0006.09, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Issues Final Rule on 
Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, Jan. 12, 2009, available at www.usda.gov. 
 2. Country of Origin Labeling on Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Perishable 
Agricultural Commodities, Macadamia Nuts, Pecans, Peanuts, and Ginseng, 7 C.F.R. §65 
(2009). 
 3. Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, 
Wild and Farm-Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, 
Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 74 Fed. Reg. 2658 (Dep’t of Agric. Jan. 15, 
2009) (final rule) [hereinafter COOL]. 
 4. The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1304 (1999). 
 5. See Made in the USA? The Truth behind the labels, CONSUMER REPORTS, (Mar. 
2008), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money/shopping/shopping-tips/country-of-
origin-3-08/overview/country-of-origin-ov.htm. For further description of labeling re-
quirements for car parts and die cast model cars look to U.S. International Trade Com-
mission rulings such as HQ 562393 (Aug. 5, 2002) and HQ 561165 (Feb. 12, 1999), 
available through the Customs Rulings Online Search System at http://rulings.cbp.gov. 
Both the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the U.S. Customs Border Protection 
(“CBP”) have country of origin labeling laws for textile products, which translates to a 
familiar “Made in India” on the tag of your T-shirt. India is just one example of the nu-
merous places from where we import clothing. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, THREADING YOUR WAY THROUGH THE LABELING REQUIREMENTS UNDER 
THE TEXTILE AND WOOL ACTS (May 2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/textile/bus21.shtm#origin; CBP Rules of Ori-
gin for Textile and Apparel Products, 19 C.F.R. § 102.21 (2008). 
I 
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processing.6 COOL requirements now ensure that all of your ground 
meat (and many other foodstuffs) at the meat counter has an origin label, 
too.7 Despite a long history of labeling, Canada has challenged COOL at 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), saying it is inconsistent with 
obligations the U.S. has committed to under a number of international 
trade agreements.8 
This note argues that COOL is a proper measure for providing con-
sumers with desired information, but that it creates an inappropriate re-
striction on international trade in violation of U.S. obligations to the 
WTO. Part I explains why the U.S. finally created labeling regulations, 
exploring the different mechanisms considered, but not adopted, and illu-
strating the type of regulation COOL embodies. This background Section 
details the requirements of COOL, walking through the changes made to 
the final rule in an attempt to clarify what COOL means for domestic 
producers and importers. Part II expands upon what COOL does for in-
terested consumers and makes a case for the recognition of consumers’ 
right to know as a legitimate objective. Part III gives a brief explanation 
of U.S. WTO obligations and attendant agreements, and Part IV argues 
that COOL is inconsistent with a number of those provisions, thus com-
promising the validity of the regulation. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Section strives to put forth the reasoning behind the new U.S. leg-
islation. The first Part begins with an explanation of the increased con-
cern over the safety and source of our foodstuffs. It reviews the power of 
consumer preferences and willingness to pay principles that make labe-
ling an attractive option of conveying source information to the consum-
er. The second Section describes the types of labeling and the issues in-
volved in each scheme. The final Section explains COOL requirements. 
A. Consumer knowledge and power 
A number of Latin terms, scientific codes, and acronyms have been 
splashed across newspapers lately: H1N1 (formerly called swine flu) on 
the subway, Salmonella in your peanut butter, E. coli with your fresh 
                                                                                                             
 6. Reading Rooms: Country of Origin Labeling (COOL),THE NAT’L AGRIC. LAW 
CTR.,  http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/readingrooms/cool/ (last updated July 2010). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Canada, United States—Certain 
Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/8 (Oct. 9, 2009) [herei-
nafter Request for Panel]. 
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spinach, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy (also known as mad cow 
disease) on your beef.9 These outbreaks have become so numerous and 
frequent that a recent study by the Center for Food Integrity showed food 
safety as the highest ranked non-economic issue among consumers.10 
Labels do not curb the incidence of disease, but they can help consumers 
make informed choices about what they purchase. Labels give consumers 
                                                                                                             
 9. There has not been any link between eating pork, or any meat products, and con-
tracting “swine flu.” See Clifford Krauss, Canadian Hog Industry Seeks Redress on U.S. 
Food-Labeling Law, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009, at B3. 
 10. Food Safety, Affordability Top List of Consumer Concerns, FOOD PRODUCT 
DESIGN (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.foodproductdesign.com/news/2009/09/food-safety-
cost-worry-consumers.aspx (citing THE CENTER FOR FOOD INTEGRITY, CONSUMER TRUST 
IN THE FOOD SYSTEM QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH STUDY HIGHLIGHTS (Oct. 2009), available 
at http://www.foodintegrity.org/pdf/2009_research_summary.pdf). A number of new 
efforts have been undertaken to address these concerns. With regard to the recent salmo-
nella outbreak, criminal proceedings have been initiated on behalf of those who were 
sickened, and Georgia passed a bill requiring food processors to report contamination 
within twenty-four hours of testing. See Peanut Butter Salmonella Outbreak 2009, FOOD 
SAFETY RESEARCH AND RESPONSE NETWORK, 
http://www.fsrrn.net/modules/content/index.php?id=163 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). This 
twenty-four-hour turnaround is stricter than the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
requirement mandating food-processing facilities to report when there is a reasonable 
probability that food could have harmful health consequences. See Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §350d (2002). In response to the first confirmation of mad 
cow disease in the U.S. in 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) ordered a 
voluntary recall. See Matthew L. Wald & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. is Examining a Mad Cow 
Case, First in Country, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2003, at A1. The U.S., among other coun-
tries, has taken strict measures to prevent the spread of the disease, including prohibiting 
the use of nerve and spine material in animal feed. See 21 C.F.R. § 589.2000 (2003); 
Michael Abramson, Mad Cow Disease: An Approach to its Containment, 7 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 316, 334 (2004). But even though the risk of getting sick is low, spe-
cialists suggest consumers avoid eating beef from places where problems have been 
found. See GREG LARDY ET AL., BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE: MAD COW 
DISEASE), N.D. STATE UNIV. EXTENSION SERV. (April 2004), available at 
www.ag.ndsu.edu/pubs/ansci/beef/as1206.pdf. Labels can help consumers do so. See 
HYUN J. JIN ET. AL., THE EFFECTS OF BSE OUTBREAKS IN THE UNITED STATES ON THE BEEF 
AND CATTLE INDUSTRY, N.D. ST. U. SPECIAL REPORT 03-4 11 (2004). And in part, as a 
response to the 2006 E. coli outbreak in spinach, which sickened 205 people, the USDA 
is currently considering a marketing agreement for handling leafy green vegetables. See 
USDA Regulation for Leafy Green Industries?, E. COLI BLOG (Nov. 29, 2007) 
http://www.ecoliblog.com/2007/11/articles/e-coli-watch/usda-regulation-for-leafy-green-
industries/. The proposed agreement, currently open for public comment, would create 
voluntary standards for production and handling practices, and those who participate may 
use a certification mark on their product packages. That certification mark is intended to 
enhance consumer confidence. See Leafy Green Vegetables Handled in the United States, 
74 Fed. Reg. 45565–01 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 970). 
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the option of avoiding meat from places experiencing outbreaks.11 Better 
identification and tracking can also help governments take swift and ef-
fective action in case of an outbreak.12 There have been numerous studies 
showing that consumers overwhelmingly support country of origin labels 
on their meat.13 There are many ways information can be conveyed to 
consumers, and different labeling schemes work for different situations; 
these systems are briefly explored below. 
B. Labeling 
Product packages convey various kinds of information to the consum-
er. Food packages now convey information about nutrient content, possi-
ble allergens, and methods of preparation, among other things.14 Some 
packages are so loaded with tiny print that a consumer cannot be ex-
pected to understand the intended message, let alone read the entire box. 
Some of what is found on packaging is intended for marketing purposes, 
but an increasing portion of it is in response to consumer demands.15 The 
following Sections explain the different types of labeling systems, illu-
                                                                                                             
 11. JIN ET. AL, supra note 10, at 11. 
 12. Caroline Smith DeWaal, Dir. of Food Safety, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, 
Statement at National Press Club: Chasing Tomatoes? (July 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/tracability___st_paul_outbreak_statement__july_3l.pdf. 
 13. Surveys show that 80 to 90 percent of respondents want origin labels on their 
food. See Press Release, Food & Water Watch Org., Food Labeling: 82% Support COOL 
(Mar. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Press Release, Food Labeling], available at 
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/press/releases/food-labeling-82-percent-support-
cool-article03252007?searchterm=support+cool; Consumer Reports Food-Labeling Poll 
Shows Consumers Want to Know Where Their Food Comes From and Expect Higher 
Label Standards,  GREENER CHOICES ( July 7, 2007) [hereinafter Consumer Reports], 
http://mangroveactionproject.org/news/current_headlines/consumer-reports-food-
labeling-poll-shows-consumers-want-to-know-where-their-food-comes-from-and-expect-
higher-label-standards/; Zogby Poll: 85% Want to Know Where Their Food Comes From, 
ZOGBY INT’L (Aug. 9, 2007), http://www.zogby.com/News/ReadNews.cfm?ID=1345 
[hereinafter Zogby Poll]. 
 14. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
 15. 74 Fed. Reg. 2658. See also PHIL HOWARD, THE CENTER FOR AGROECOLOGY AND 
SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYSTEMS, UC SANTA CRUZ, WHAT DO PEOPLE WANT TO KNOW ABOUT 
THEIR FOOD? MEASURING CENTRAL COAST CONSUMERS’ INTEREST IN FOOD SYSTEMS 
ISSUES (2005), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/75s222dm; Elliot B. Staffin, 
Trade Barrier or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of Environmental Labeling and its 
Role in the “Greening” of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 215 (1996) (dis-
cussing the use of voluntary labels for marketing purposes); Atsuko Okubo, Environmen-
tal Labeling Programs and the GATT/WTO Regime, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 599, 
605 (1999). 
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strating the purposes of each type of system, and lay out the reasoning 
behind COOL’s formulation. 
1. Types of labeling systems 
Although there are many different labeling programs, they can general-
ly be categorized into three groups: “(1) mandatory government-
sponsored schemes; (2) voluntary government-sponsored schemes; and 
(3) voluntary private-sponsored schemes.”16 
Mandatory government-sponsored schemes are those that require 
packages to contain certain information. Negative-content labeling 
schemes warn consumers about a product’s adverse environmental or 
health effects.17 One example is warning labels on cigarettes. In contrast, 
positive-content labeling schemes illustrate the benefits of a particular 
product over its competitors, like dolphin-safe tuna labels.18 The theory 
behind positive labeling is that when consumers are aware of the impacts 
of their purchases, they will create demand for more friendly or healthy 
products.19 In turn, those friendly and healthy products will benefit by 
gaining market share.20 Neutral labeling schemes disclose information to 
the consumer that the government has deemed important to their deci-
sion-making, like fuel efficiency ratings on new cars sold in the U.S.21 
Governments often play a role in voluntary labeling schemes as well.22 
As long as their products fulfill the predetermined conditions, producers 
may opt to use these labels because of market pressure.23 Government-
based voluntary schemes provide: “(1) consistency in criteria; (2) bal-
ance of views of the different parties; (3) greater accountability to the 
public; and (4) greater program transparency.”24 For instance, U.S. pro-
ducers may elect to label their products “grass fed” through an applica-
tion for certification by the USDA and submitting documentation and 
                                                                                                             
 16. John J. Emslie, Labeling Programs as a Reasonably Available Least Restrictive 
Trade Measure Under Article XX’s Nexus Requirement, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 485, 494 
(2005). See generally STEVE SUPPAN, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y, THE CANADIAN 
AND MEXICAN WTO CHALLENGES TO U.S. COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING, (2009), avail-
able at http://www.iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?refid=105552 (arguing that proponents 
of COOL believe the labeling program can give them market leverage). 
 17. See Staffin, supra note 15, at 211. 
 18. See Emslie, supra note 16, at 495. 
 19. See Okubo, supra note 15, at 601. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. at 604; Emslie, supra note 16, at 495. 
 22. Okubo, supra note 15, at 605. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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testimony for review.25 The government creates the standards producers 
must meet, such as defining “grass fed,” after accounting for various in-
terests.26 The proposed marketing agreement for leafy greens is another 
example of a voluntary labeling program.27 
Voluntary labeling schemes supported by private sponsors have shown 
up on many grocery shelves.28 There is no government oversight or par-
ticipation in these schemes.29 Private voluntary systems may be orga-
nized by third party independents.30 The American Heart Association 
offers a “heart healthy” stamp of approval for products that have whole 
grains, are low fat, or are high in fiber.31 “Smart Choices” is another such 
labeling system that indicates a product is a healthy choice.32 Producers 
pay to be a part of such labeling schemes.33 
Private voluntary systems can also be based on self-assessment—i.e. 
claims the producers make about themselves.34 According to guidelines 
put forth by the International Standards Organization, producers can add 
any label to their goods if there is no definition or criteria for it yet, 
though they must be sure to be specific and not misleading.35 The recy-
cling symbol, seen on the bottom of many packages indicating recyclable 
content, is a widely recognized self-declaration label.36 
                                                                                                             
 25. See FARM SANCTUARY, THE TRUTH BEHIND THE LABELS: FARM ANIMAL WELFARE 
STANDARDS AND LABELING PRACTICES 17 (April 2009). 
 26. See id. However, the certification program is also voluntary which means that 
producers may use the label without submitting their documentation for review. This 
makes the label itself open to the subjective interpretation of the producer who may 
choose to use it as a marketing tool. The value of such a label for consumer interests is 
therefore negligible. 
 27. See Leafy Green Vegetables Handled in the United States, 74 Fed. Reg. 45565–
01 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 970). 
 28. Rebecca Ruiz, Eight Puzzling Food Labels, FORBES.COM (Sept. 23, 2009, 4:15 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/23/food-labels-healthy-lifestyle-health-smart-
choices-nutrition.html [hereinafter Ruiz, Eight]. 
 29. Emslie, supra note 16, at 497. 
 30. See id.; Okubo, supra note 15, at 607. 
 31. Ruiz, Eight, supra note 28. 
 32. Paying to participate and help craft the labeling schemes may introduce bias. 
Rebecca Ruiz, Smart Choices Foods: Dumb As They Look? FORBES.COM (Sept. 17, 2009, 
6:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/17/smart-choices-labels-lifestyle-health-
foods.html. 
 33. Ruiz, Eight, supra note 28. 
 34. See Emslie, supra note 16, at 497. 
 35. See Okubo, supra note 15, at 608–609. 
 36. See id. at 609. 
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2. COOL: A Mandatory Labeling System 
Country-of-origin labels are an example of neutral government-
mandated schemes. They do not provide the consumer with any sugges-
tive information; COOL seeks only to help the consumer make an in-
formed decision.37 Yet, these labels may induce positive or negative res-
ponses depending on a consumer’s own interests. Some companies vo-
luntarily affix country-of-origin labels such as ‘made in America’ or 
‘product of USA’ to appeal to consumer desires to support American 
manufacturing.38 Often, origin is an integral part of the value of the good 
itself. For instance, people may be willing to pay more for a leather bag 
or shoes made from Italian leather, because they believe Italian leather 
products are superior.39 It is this perceived value of a “product of USA” 
label that led Canada to denounce COOL as a protectionist measure.40 
U.S. lawmakers suggested a voluntary program, which may have had 
more traction in the WTO, but ultimately, the mandatory scheme became 
law.41 Prior to final implementation of the regulation, labeling was vo-
luntary, though few producers complied.42 It was said that the costs of 
labeling outweighed consumers’ willingness to pay more for the labeled 
product, but the USDA believes that the costs and benefits will balance 
out.43 The costs to producers are a concern only to the extent to which it 
                                                                                                             
 37. Staffin, supra note 15, at 214. 
 38. These labels are strictly regulated by the Federal Trade Commission. See general-
ly FED. TRADE COMM’N,  COMPLYING WITH THE MADE IN THE USA STANDARD (1998), 
available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/adv/bus03.shtm; ROGER SIMMERMAKER, 
HOW AMERICANS CAN BUY AMERICAN: THE POWER OF CONSUMER PATRIOTISM (2008) 
(explaining strategies to keep profits and jobs within the domestic economy). 
 39. Personal interview with Amy Handler, student and avid shopper (Nov. 16, 2009). 
Geographic indicators, although a trademark issue, not a matter of country-of-origin, 
illustrate this point as well. Appellations such as Champagne and Roquefort are stringent-
ly protected in France lest they be used in such a way as to devalue the name. See Jim 
Chen, A Sober Second Look at Appellations of Origin: How the United States Will Crash 
France’s Wine and Cheese Party, 5. MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 29, 32–33 (1996). 
 40. See Krauss, supra note 9; FMI Backgrounder: Country of Origin Labeling for 
Food, FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE, 
http://www.fmi.org/media/bg/COL_backgrounder.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2009) [herei-
nafter FMI Backgrounder]. 
 41. See FMI Backgrounder, supra note 40. 
 42. See Trying Voluntary COOL . . . . Again, NEBRASKA FARMER (May 26, 2004), 
available at http://nebraskafarmer.com/story.aspx?s=627&c=8. 
 43. See Wendy J. Umberger, Will Consumers Pay a Premium for Country-of-Origin 
Labeled Meat?, CHOICES: THE MAGAZINE OF FOOD, FARM, AND RESOURCE ISSUES, 4th 
Quarter 2004, at 15 [hereinafter Umberger, CHOICES]; COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. 2658, 2681–
91. 
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restrains trade and, to that end, whether the consumers’ right to know 
justifies that infringement. Before going any further into the rights of the 
public and the requirements of international agreements, it is important 
to know what COOL demands and how it differs from prior regulations. 
C. COOL: The new U.S. food labeling requirements 
“[U]nder the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1681b, nearly 
every item imported into the United States must indicate to the ultimate 
purchaser its country of origin.”44 The “ultimate purchaser” under this 
act was the importer, the grocer; origin information was passed to the last 
person receiving “the article in the form in which it was imported.”45 So, 
the information was only passed on to consumers if the good was im-
ported in packages ready for retail.46 If the product was slated for addi-
tional processing, the U.S. manufacturer was considered the ultimate 
purchaser.47 In practice, an article that underwent a “substantial trans-
formation”—a manufacturing or combining process that results in a 
change of name, character, or use of the item—would be deemed to ori-
ginate in the country in which it was last substantially transformed.48 
Additionally, many items, such as fruits, vegetables, nuts, and animals 
(dead or alive) were exempt from this labeling requirement.49 The Farm 
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (“2002 Farm Bill”) shifted 
the labeling requirements of the 1930 Tariff Act to require indication of 
country of origin at the point of final sale to the consumer.50 Whereas 
under the old law, a grocery received shipments with an origin stamp on 
the box, now the consumer will get origin information not just on pre-
packaged goods, but also on goods in the produce department and at the 
butcher counter. 
                                                                                                             
 44. THE NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CTR., COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING (COOL): AN 
OVERVIEW (2009) [hereinafter NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CTR.], available at 
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/overviews/cool.html. 
 45. See GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN 
LABELING FOR FOODS 1 (2008). 
 46. Daisuke Kojo, The Importance of the Geographic Origin of Agricultural Prod-
ucts: A Comparison of Japanese and American Approaches, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 275, 301 (2007). 
 47. BECKER, supra note 45. 
 48. Country of Origin Marking, 19 C.F.R. § 134.35 (2009). 
 49. See NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CTR., supra note 44. According to customs, substantial 
transformation occurs when the manufacturing process changes the name, character, or 
use of the product. 19 C.F.R. §§ 134.35, 134.33. 
 50. COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2658. 
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In effect, the 2002 Farm Bill, and provisions of the “2008 Farm Bill[] 
amended the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 (Act) to require retail-
ers to notify consumers of the country of origin of covered commodi-
ties.”51 COOL creates new labeling requirements, mandating labels on 
many commodities formerly excluded and labeling those products until 
they actually get to the consumer instead of just stopping with the impor-
ter/retailer/wholesaler.52 The implementation of COOL was delayed 
twice, and only became effective on March 16, 2009.53 In its ultimate 
form, COOL covers country of origin labeling for beef, pork, lamb, 
chicken, perishable agricultural commodities, macadamia nuts, pecans, 
peanuts, and ginseng.54 The rule goes on to explain that no matter how 
the commodity is offered for sale, whether in bulk, cluster, or individual 
package, it must contain a country of origin label.55 
The USDA has laid out acceptable labeling terms for all covered 
commodities. For muscle cuts of meat born, raised, and slaughtered in 
the U.S., the label may say “Product of U.S.(A).” or simply “U.S.(A).”56 
For those animals born elsewhere but raised and slaughtered in the U.S., 
the label must contain every location in which the animal has been, but it 
does not matter in what order they are listed.57 Animals that have been 
imported into the U.S. for immediate slaughter must be labeled “Product 
of Country X and U.S.(A).”58 Muscle cuts of meat that have been com-
mingled during production with cuts of different categories, i.e. varying 
degrees of production in the U.S., must include all countries from 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. at 2658 (emphasis added). 
 52. See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text. 
 53. 7 C.F.R. § 65. This note will only discuss the regulations as they pertain to meat; 
for brevity’s sake it does not dwell on the rules about fish and shellfish (7 C.F.R. §60, 
effective as of April 2005), and largely disregards those regarding perishable agricultural 
commodities, nuts, and ginseng (7 C.F.R. § 65). 
 54. 7 C.F.R. § 65.100. 
 55. 7 C.F.R. § 65.300(a). For the label itself, there are no requirements as to size or 
placement; the only requirement is that all designations are legible and conspicuous. See 
COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2662. As long as the location is reasonably known, state or region 
may be designated instead of country for perishable commodities and nuts. See 7 C.F.R. § 
65.400(f). For all covered commodities, abbreviations approved by the United States 
Postal Service or the United States Customs and Border Patrol are permitted for use be-
cause these are unmistakable indicators of country of origin. See COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
2673. 
 56. Country of Origin Notification, 7 C.F.R. § 65.300(d) (2009). See also United 
States Country of Origin, 7 C.F.R. § 65.260 (2009). For those animals present in the U.S. 
before July 15, 2008, where the animal was born and raised does not matter. Id. § 65.260. 
 57. Id. § 65.300(e)(1). 
 58. Id. § 65.300(e)(3). 
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whence the meat came, but may do so in any order.59 For ground meat 
the label must list all countries that may have contributed meat to the 
product.60 This scheme has come under scrutiny; a director of the Cana-
dian Cattlemen’s Association suggests instead that the label reflect the 
place in which the product undergoes its last substantial transformation.61 
Two important exceptions in COOL are for food service establish-
ments and for processed food items.62 The first applies to all facilities 
engaged in the business of selling food to the public, both salad bar types 
of establishments and those providing ready-to-eat foods.63 On one hand, 
granting exemptions to all restaurants indicates that COOL’s primary 
concern is about what consumers are bringing into their own kitchens, 
not necessarily what they are consuming in general. However, Canada 
may use these exceptions to illustrate the willingness of U.S. lawmakers 
to make some exceptions, and thereby compromise the U.S. position on 
the consumers’ right to know, since consumers presumably want to know 
origin information for all food wherever it is eaten. 
The exemption for processed food items created quite a bit of contro-
versy domestically.64 Under the final rule, “products . . . subject to cur-
ing, smoking, broiling, grilling, or steaming” are not covered.65 Products 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. § 65.300(e)(2). 
 60. Id. § 65.300(h). 
 61. Interview by Brian Allmer with John Masswohl, Director of Gov’t & Int’l Rela-
tions, Canadian Cattlemen’s Association, Briggsdale, Colo (Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter 
Interview with John Masswohl], available at 
http://brianallmerradionetwork.wordpress.com/2009/10/08/10-08-09-canada-files-wto-
challenge-on-cool/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2009/). Doing so would basically be a reversion 
back to the policy the U.S. had since 1930 that COOL sought to change. 
 62. 7 C.F.R. §§ 65.125, 65.145. 
 63. See COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2660. 
 64. See Chris Waldrop, Consumer Fed’n of Am., Statement on the Implementation of 
Country of Origin Labeling, (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.consumerfed.org 
(hyperlink to “press releases”); Comment from Land Stewardship Project, to Country of 
Origin Labeling Program, USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (Sept. 30, 2008) [herei-
nafter Land Stewardship Project] available at regulations.gov (search “Country of Origin 
Labeling”; then search within search for “Land Stewardship Project”; then follow “AMS-
LS-07-0081-0756” hyperlink under ID); Comment from Iowa Citizens for Community 
Improvement, to Country of Origin Labeling Program, USDA Agricultural Marketing 
Service (Sept. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Iowa Citizens for Community Improvement], avail-
able at regulations.gov (search “Country of Origin Labeling”; then search within search 
for “Iowa Citizens for Community Improvement”; then follow “AMS-LS-07-0081-0744” 
hyperlink under ID). 
 65. Letter from Thomas Vilsack, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., to Industry Rep-
resentatives (Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Vilsack Letter], available at 
www.usda.gov/documents/0220_IndustryLetterCOOL.pdf. 
2010] FUTURE OF U.S. COOL REGULATIONS 309 
that are combined with different covered commodities are exempt, mean-
ing large portions of purchases remain off the map.66 The Agricultural 
Marketing Service believes the rule establishes a bright line test.67 Yet, 
others have argued that the definition is too broad and contravenes the 
intent of the regulation: a bag of frozen peas must be labeled, but a bag 
of frozen peas and carrots need not be.68 
Much has been said about the increased cost of maintaining separate 
production lines and records to satisfy COOL requirements. Some be-
lieve the cost of COOL will easily pass to the consumer, while others 
think the cost of compliance will be so high that some will simply use a 
multiple origin label rather than maintain separate records.69 Studies on 
willingness to pay have shown mixed results, consumers express opi-
nions about theoretical preferences, but according to objective choices in 
                                                                                                             
 66. For example, a bag of mixed vegetables. COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2667. See Wal-
drop, supra note 63; COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2660–61 (listing the types of items that will 
be exempt). See also Land Stewardship Project, supra note 64. See generally New Con-
sumer Research Unveiled at the Annual Meat Conference, American Meat Institute (Feb. 
19, 2007), http://www.meatami.com/sites/amif.org/ht/d/ReleaseDetails/i/2833 (explaining 
that some 70% of U.S. consumers buy their meat from conventional supermarkets). 
 67. Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, 
Wild and Farm-Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, 
Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 73 Fed. Reg. 45106, 45115 (Dep’t of Agric. Aug. 
1, 2008) (Interim final rule with request for comments) [hereinafter Interim final rule]. 
The rule uses the same definition as was used in the seafood regulation to create consis-
tency. 7 C.F.R. § 60. The Food Marketing Institute supports the exemption because it 
provides for ease of use by creating a single standard across the board. See Letter from 
Deborah R. White, Senior Vice President, Food Marketing Inst., to COOL Program Ad-
ministrators (Sept. 30, 2008), available at regulations.gov (search “Country of Origin 
Labeling”; then search within search for “Food Marketing Institute”; then follow “AMS-
LS-07-0081-0801” hyperlink under Docket ID). 
 68. Waldrop, supra note 63. Some have gone so far as to say that consumers will 
become distrustful of the labeling system that acknowledges the origin of a raw whole 
chicken but not a roasted chicken. Land Stewardship Project, supra note 64; Iowa Citi-
zens for Community Improvement, supra note 64. 
 69. See COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2681–93; U.S. Cattlemen Praise Tyson & Cargill for 
Decision on COOL Compliance, CATTLE NETWORK.COM ( Oct. 21, 2008), 
http://www.cattlenetwork.com/U-S—Cattlemen-Praise-Tyson—-Cargill-For-Decision-
On-COOL-Compliance/2008-10-21/Article.aspx?oid=564366; National Pork Producers 
Council (NPPC) says country-of-origin labeling (COOL) is too costly, NAT’L HOG 
FARMER (Oct. 9, 2008), http://nationalhogfarmer.com/marketing/1009-nppc-cool-
costly/index.html; R-CALF USA 2007 Stampede Fact Sheet: Country of Origin Labeling 
for Beef, R-CALF USA, http://www.r-
calfusa.com/COOL/country_of_origin_labeling.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009); NFU 
Applauds Strengthened COOL Standards, NAT’L FARMERS UNION (Feb. 20, 2009), 
http://nfu.org/news/2009/02/20/nfu-applauds-strengthened-cool-standards.html. 
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the supermarket, origin is not always the motivating concern.70 It is 
worth noting that although U.S. consumers have indicated a preference 
for U.S. products, COOL will not necessarily bring any added economic 
benefit to U.S. producers if the cost of compliance is not offset by in-
creased sales or higher prices.71 However, even if there is no measurable 
economic benefit, consumers are the ones who bear the cost, and there-
fore, they are the ones whose concerns should be appeased by providing 
the desired labels.72 
II. CONSUMER RIGHT TO KNOW 
Numerous studies show that consumers support country of origin la-
bels on their meat. A 2007 study by Food & Water Watch, a consumer 
group, found that eighty-two percent of respondents supported COOL.73 
A study conducted in that same year by Consumers Union showed that 
ninety-two percent of respondents believed country of origin labels 
should be affixed to all imported foods.74 Respondents to a poll con-
ducted by Zogby International said they did not just want to know where 
their food was coming from; ninety-four percent believed it was their 
right to know the country of origin of their purchases.75 With such over-
whelmingly popular support for COOL, comfort should be taken in the 
fact that political bodies are responding positively to the public’s de-
mands.76 Nevertheless, policy-making is about striking a balance be-
tween numerous interests and obligations; one of those obligations is to 
uphold promises made to the international community. So the question 
becomes: does the consumer have the right to know? And does that right 
                                                                                                             
 70. See generally Wendy Umberger, Dillon M. Feuz, Chris R. Calkins & Bethany M. 
Sitz, Country-of-Origin Labeling of Beef Products: U.S. Consumers’ Perceptions, 34 J. 
FOOD DISTRIBUTION RES. 103–16 (2003) [hereinafter Umberger, Country-of-Origin Labe-
ling] (finding that the amount people were willing to pay depended upon a number of 
concerns regarding food safety, preference for different sources, quality perceptions, and 
desire to support U.S. farmers); Maria L. Loureiro & Wendy Umberger, Assessing Con-
sumer Preferences for Country-of-Origin Labeling, 37 J. OF AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 49 
(2005) (finding respondents were concerned about food safety and therefore wanted their 
meat certified U.S. but were not willing to pay nearly enough to cover the cost of 
COOL). 
 71. See Kojo, supra note 46, at 304. 
 72. Id. at 305. 
 73. See Press Release, Food Labeling, supra note 13. 
 74. Consumer Reports, supra note 13. 
 75. Zogby Poll, supra note 13. 
 76. See Press Release, Food Labeling, supra note 13; Consumer Reports, supra note 
13; Zogby Poll, supra note 13. 
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justify restrictions on international trade that are otherwise in violation of 
international obligations? 
In the context of labeling, the concept of a “right to know” is that con-
sumers have an interest in any fact that they “deem[] important about a 
food or commodity before being forced to make a purchasing deci-
sion.”77 The issue has cropped up in a number of different areas, most 
notably, in the EU, where labeling for genetically modified foods was 
driven by “the principle of informed consumer choice.”78 Previously, 
U.S. Courts have supported the Food and Drug Administration’s 
(“FDA”) position that it is not authorized to issue labeling requirements 
based solely on consumer demands.79 However, since Congressional ac-
tion authorized the promulgation of COOL as a way to inform consum-
ers—reflecting the public desire to have the information—it will there-
fore be upheld in U.S. Courts.80 
While barriers to passing the bill have already been overcome, COOL 
may now create a barrier to international trade. Country-of-origin labels 
are not new, and thirty-four of fifty-seven U.S. trading partners have 
some type of origin labeling law to cover imported cut and ground 
                                                                                                             
 77. See Frederick Degnan, The Food Label and the Right to Know, 52 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 49, 50 (1997). 
 78. M.J. Sadler, Modified Foods and Ingredients, in FOOD LABELLING, 221, 221 (J. 
Ralph Blanchfield ed., 2000). 
 79. See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179 (2000); Stau-
ber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1193 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (holding that “the use of con-
sumer demand as the rationale for labeling would violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act” in support of the FDA decision not to mandate labels for milk from cows treated 
with synthetic hormones); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 
1996) (The court held that consumer concern alone was an insufficient state interest to 
justify restriction on constitutionally protected rights to free speech. The right upheld 
here is to be free from mandatory labeling requirements that are not deemed material to 
prevent the consumer from being misled.). See also Degnan, supra note 77, at 56–57; 
Tupman Thurlow Co. v. Moss, 252 F. Supp 641, 645 (D.C. Tenn. 1966) (the court struck 
down a state requirement to label meat as “foreign origin” or “domestic,” in an attempt to 
protect consumers against fraud and deception, as a violation of the Commerce Clause). 
Nonetheless, these cases only indicate that in the past, consumer interest has not been 
enough to convince the court to hold a federal agency responsible for creating labeling 
requirements. There is nothing prohibiting a federal agency from creating mandatory 
labels within the language of their authorizing statute. 
 80. In fact, a recent case brought against the USDA to enjoin COOL was dismissed, 
because there was no showing that the action was arbitrary and capricious. See Easterday 
Ranches Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2008 WL 4426004 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2008). 
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meat.81 The EU origin labeling requirements are much more extensive 
than in the U.S., requiring all beef to be labeled by country of birth, fat-
tening, slaughter, cutting, and deboning.82 “None of these long-standing 
requirements have ever been challenged as barriers to trade.”83 Apparent-
ly, COOL has made a significant enough impact on trade that Canada 
feels it is necessary to challenge its validity. Whether or not the consum-
er’s right is strong enough to justify an infringement upon international 
trade will likely be the crux of the challenge the U.S. will have to over-
come. 
III. WTO DISPUTE AND RELEVANT AGREEMENTS 
The USDA said it considered international trade obligations in devel-
oping the COOL regulations, yet Canada filed a complaint with the WTO 
on December 1, 2008, before the rule was finalized.84 Canada alleges that 
COOL regulations are inconsistent with a number of obligations under 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT” Agreement) or the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(“SPS” Agreement), the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 1994 
(“GATT 1994”), and Article 2 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin.85 
This Section explains the WTO dispute process, the method of treaty 
interpretation, and the relevant agreements at issue in Canada’s allega-
tions. 
                                                                                                             
 81. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING: OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR USDA AND INDUSTRY TO IMPLEMENT CHALLENGING ASPECTS OF THE NEW LAW, 23–
24 (2003) [hereinafter GAO, COOL]. 
 82. Council Regulation 1760/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 204) 1 [hereinafter Council Regula-
tion 1760/2000]. 
 83. Letter from Wenonah Hauter, Exec. Dir., Food & Water Watch, to Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative (Jul. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=0900006480910
4c7. 
 84. See COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2679; Request for Consultation by Canada, United 
States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS348/1/Add.1 
(May 11, 2009) [hereinafter Request for Consultation]. 
 85. Request for Panel, supra note 8. There is no WTO agreement that directly deals 
with food labeling laws. Food safety rules are under the purview of the SPS Agreement, 
which relies on scientific support. Because COOL is premised upon consumer protection, 
it is unlikely to fall under SPS Agreement obligations. However, because food safety 
issues, like mad cow disease, played a major role in pushing this legislation forward, SPS 
Agreement obligations may very well apply. See generally Steve Keane, Can a Consum-
er’s Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The Case of Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 315–19 (2007). 
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A. Dispute process and treaty interpretation 
The 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) provides a fo-
rum in which members may bring claims against one another for non-
compliance with any WTO agreement.86 The parties are to engage in a 
series of consultations in an attempt to settle their differences by mutual 
agreement.87 Upon request, a panel is convened to hear arguments and 
issue a binding report that is reviewable by a standing appellate body.88 
Pursuant to the DSU, a Panel was convened on November 19, 2009 to 
address Canada’s complaints against the U.S. in regards to COOL.89 
The DSU requires agreements to be interpreted “in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”90 
“[C]ustomary rules,” the Appellate Body has explained, are those laid 
out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Conven-
tion”).91 The Vienna Convention requires that “a treaty . . . be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context in light of its object and purpose.”92 
The body of reports that have been issued in accordance with these DSU 
provisions serve as guidance to the interpretation of the following 
agreements raised in Canada’s complaint. 
B. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
The TBT Agreement governs technical regulations and standards, in-
cluding both mandatory and voluntary labeling requirements, to avoid 
the creation of unnecessary obstacles to trade or discrimination between 
                                                                                                             
 86. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes 
art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 87. Id. art. 4. 
 88. Id. arts. 4, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17. 
 89. DSB authorizes Brazil countermeasures in “cotton” case, establishes “COOL” 
and poultry panels, WTO NEW ITEMS ( Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/dsb_19nov09_e.htm. 
 90. DSU, supra note 86, art. 3.2. 
 91. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, 17, WT/DS2/AB (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.—Gasoline]. 
 92. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Context includes any additional text about and any 
agreements made between all parties of the dispute, taking into account any subsequent 
agreement and practice the parties have developed. 
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countries.93 Article 2.1 states that “products imported from the territory 
of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originat-
ing in any other country.”94 Therefore, among WTO members, all “like 
products,”95 whether imported or domestic, must be treated equally with 
respect to taxes, charges, and regulations.96 
TBT Agreement Article 2.2 requires that technical regulations not 
“creat[e] unnecessary obstacles to international trade . . . [and] shall not 
be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objec-
tive . . . .”97 The agreement lists a number of objectives that would be 
considered legitimate, the most pertinent to COOL is the prevention of 
deceptive practices.98 Members are supposed to account for the risks that 
non-fulfillment, like not preventing deception, would create based on 
“available scientific and technical information . . . [and] intended end-
uses of products.”99 
Article 2.4 requires that relevant international standards be used as a 
basis for technical regulations whenever available.100 Canada alleges that 
the Codex General Standard for the Labelling of Prepackaged Foods is 
one such standard.101 The Codex requires prepackaged food to be labeled 
                                                                                                             
 93. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade pmbl, arts. 1–2, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter 
TBT Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf. 
 94. TBT Agreement, supra note 93, art. 2.1. This requirement is a reflection of GATT 
obligations Most Favored Nations and national treatment. But, as stated in its preamble, 
the TBT Agreement grants an exception allowing members to take measures necessary to 
protect security. See id. 
 95. The term “like products” will be more fully discussed as it is used in the GATT 
Art. III:4 see infra text accompanying notes 114 to 122. 
 96. Arthur E. Appleton, Colloquium Article: The Labeling of GMO Products Pur-
suant to International Trade Rules, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 566, 575 (2000). 
 97. TBT Agreement, supra note 93, art. 2.2. 
 98. Id. The others include national security requirements, protection of human health 
or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.art 2.4. 
 101. Request for Panel, supra note 8. The Codex is developed by a joint commission of 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) and the United Nations 
World Health Organization (“WHO”), to create food standards to protect consumer 
health and fair practices in international trade. For more information, see FAO/WHO 
Standards, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2010), [hereinafter CODEX ALIMENTARIUS]. The WTO recognizes 
the Codex as a point of reference for international standards. Agreement on the Applica-
tion of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Es-
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with the country-of-origin “if its omission would mislead or deceive the 
consumer.”102 While this requirement applies to all prepackaged foods 
being sold to the individual consumer, it does not apply to unpackaged 
foodstuffs.103 
C. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures 
Any food labeling requirements directly related to food safety must 
fulfill the obligations of the SPS Agreement.104 Under the agreement, 
members may take sanitary and phytosanitary “measures necessary for 
the protection of human, animal or plant life[,] or health,” as long as the 
measure is based on scientific principles and is not simply protectionism 
in a disguised form.105 The measures may not “arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminate between Members . . . .”106 
The SPS Agreement excuses trade restrictions that protect food safety, 
animal health, or plant health.107 However, SPS measures must be based 
on assessed risks and should restrict trade as little as possible to achieve 
the appropriate level of protection, “taking into account technical and 
economic feasibility.”108 Further, for such measures to be justified they 
must be “based on scientific principles” and supported by “sufficient 
scientific evidence.”109 Exceptions are made when scientific evidence is 
insufficient if Members can show their measures are comparable to other 
Member’s measures and based on available information from relevant 
international organizations.110 Measures are “based on” evidence pro-
duced through a risk assessment, if there is a “rational relationship” be-
                                                                                                             
tablishing the WTO, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement], avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf. 
 102. Codex Alimentarius: Food Labelling-Codex General Standard for the Labelling 
of Prepackaged Foods, CODEX STAN 1-1985 (Rev. 1-1991) ¶ 4.5.1. 
 103. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
 104. SPS Agreement, supra note 101. 
 105. Id. art. 2.1. 
 106. Id. It is worth mentioning that, although the SPS Agreement has higher standards 
for measures affecting food safety, there are no provisions explicitly requiring the prin-
ciples of most favored nation or national treatment be met, as there are in the TBT 
Agreement. 
 107. See Keane, supra note 85, at 316. 
 108. SPS Agreement, supra note 101, art. 5. 
 109. Id. art. 2.2. 
 110. See SPS Agreement, supra note 101, art. 5.7. 
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tween the SPS measure and the risk assessment itself.111 Generally, if the 
measures substantially differ from international standards and will signif-
icantly impact trade, early notice must be given so others may become 
acquainted with the new measures while amendments and comments are 
still being considered.112 
D. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
The principle of national treatment colors Canada’s entire allegation. 
The 1947 GATT supplies that no internal taxes or charges of any sort 
may be applied “to imported or domestic products so as to afford protec-
tion to domestic production.”113 National treatment, under GATT, re-
quires imports from member countries be treated “no less favorabl[y]” 
than like products of domestic origin.114 What is considered a like prod-
uct is determined on a case-by-case basis, but its determination is vital to 
the analysis.115 If products are not found to be “like,” then there are no 
further requirements of equal treatment.116 If products are considered like 
they may still be treated differently; the focus of a WTO inquiry is 
whether the different treatment results in unequal conditions of competi-
tion. 117 The following four factors may be used to analyze likeness: 
(i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end-uses of 
the products; (iii) consumers’ tastes and habits—more comprehensively 
termed consumers’ perceptions and behavior—in respect of the prod-
ucts; and (iv) the tariff classification of the products.118 
                                                                                                             
 111. Appellate Body Report, EC—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶ 193, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC—
Hormones]. 
 112. SPS Agreement, supra note 101, at Annex B, ¶ 5. 
 113. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. III.1, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 914 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 114. Id. art. III.4. 
 115. Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 21, WT/DS8, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). [hereinafter Japan—Alcoholic Beve-
rages]. 
 116. Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled 
and Frozen Beef,  ¶¶ 133–35, WT/DS161 & 169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Ko-
rea—Beef]. 
 117. See Korea—Beef, supra note 116, ¶¶ 135–36; Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, supra 
note 113, ¶¶16–17. 
 118. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-containing Products, ¶ 101, WT/DS135/AB/R, 01-1157 (Mar. 12, 2001) 
[hereinafter EC—Asbestos]. The Appellate Body declined to determine the precise scope 
of Article III.4. The Appellate Body explained that the “like” in Article III.4 is broader in 
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Article IX speaks to marks of origin, requiring countries to minimize 
any difficulty or inconvenience a measures may put on exporters.119 Fur-
ther, no law or regulation on marking imports may require “seriously 
damaging the products, or materially reducing their value, or unreasona-
bly increasing their costs.”120 There is no jurisprudence or decision of the 
WTO dispute Panel over the interpretation or application of Article 
IX.121 This is likely attributable to the fact that the Agreement on Rules 
of Origin was created at the same time, which provides much broader 
detail.122 
E. The Agreement on Rules of Origin 
Although the Canadian complaint alleges violation of the Agreement 
on Rules of Origin, it is not entirely clear that the dispute panel will ad-
dress these concerns because the Agreement is still in provisional stages. 
Therefore, this note will not address the possible application of the 
agreement. However, the following is a rough outline of what a panel 
may look for should they address the issue. 
“Rules of origin are not [to be] used as instruments to pursue trade ob-
jectives directly or indirectly.”123 The Panel looks to the objective pur-
poses of the measure as may be determined from its design, architecture, 
and structure.124 The measure may not create “restrictive, distorting, or 
                                                                                                             
scope than that in the first sentence of Article III.2, but does not extend to products that 
are “directly competitive or substitutable,” and therefore is not as broad as Article III.2 
overall. Id. ¶ 99. 
 119. GATT, supra note 113, art. IX.2. 
 120. Id. art. IX.4. 
 121. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO WTO LAW 
AND PRACTICE 261 (2003). 
 122. John J. Barceló III, Harmonizing Preferential Rules of Origin in the WTO System 
6 (Cornell L. Sch. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series Paper No. 06-049, 2006), available at 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/72. 
 123. Agreement on the Rules of Origin, art. 2(b), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the WTO, Annex A1, [hereinafter Agreement on Rules of Origin], available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/22-roo.pdf. 
 124. See Panel Report, United States—Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Prod-
ucts, ¶ 6.37, WT/DS243/R (June 20, 2003) [hereinafter US—Origin Rules]; see also Dis-
pute Settlement Commentary on US—Origin Rules 3, WORLDTRADELAW.NET, 
www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/panel/us-originrules(dsc)(panel).pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 
2010) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Commentary]. Canada may complain that country 
of origin determination should be based on the place in which a product was “substantial-
ly transformed” as their own laws dictate. But, Art. 2(b) does not require the use of any 
particular rule, and so Members are free to create them as they see fit. See COOL, 74 
Fed. Reg. at 2658. 
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disruptive effects on international trade.”125 This does not prohibit the 
restrictive or disruptive impacts commercial policy measures may have, 
but rather speaks directly to whether the rules are administered in such a 
way as to create additional distortion.126 Although the causation need not 
be deliberate, there must be a “causal link” between the rules and the 
alleged grievance to constitute a violation of Article 2(c).127 The Panel 
has not definitively outlined the scope of the term “effects on interna-
tional trade.” Yet, adverse effects on one member’s trade are not neces-
sarily sufficient evidence to prove effects on international trade, since in 
the marketplace some lose and others gain.128 Still, no showing of actual 
effects is required if the rules create the conditions to restrict, distort, or 
disrupt competition.129 Whatever the effects, the rules must be adminis-
tered impartially.130 
IV. ANALYSIS OF COOL COMPLIANCE WITH WTO OBLIGATIONS 
A. Basis of Canada’s allegation 
The WTO is exactly what it says it is—a world trade organization. 
Simply stated, its main goal is to liberalize trade by breaking down bar-
riers to entry.131 However, during the sixteen years since the formal de-
velopment of this rules-based system of coordinating global trade, there 
have been numerous conflicts with the desires of domestic industries and 
public preferences.132 This appeal is just one more illustration of that 
                                                                                                             
 125. Agreement on the Rules of Origin, art. 2(c). The allegations are only made with 
regard to Article 2, which apply during the transition period, since the Agreement has not 
yet been adopted. 
 126. US—Origin Rules, supra note 124, ¶ 6.136. See also Dispute Settlement Commen-
tary, supra note 124, at 7. 
 127. US—Origin Rules, supra note 124, ¶ 6.140. 
 128. Id. ¶ 6.148. 
 129. Id. ¶ 6.149 (Panel agrees with India’s argument set forth in their Second Written 
Submission ¶ 2(c)(iii)). 
 130. Agreement on Rules of Origin, supra note 123, art. 2(d). 
 131. What is the WTO? About the WTO—a statement by the Director-General, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm (last visited 
Aug., 2010). 
 132. WTO Agreements are not self-executing, meaning they must be turned into do-
mestic law by Members to have any effect. Decisions of the Panel similarly have no ef-
fect unless incorporated at the domestic level. For instance, a decision finding U.S. pro-
hibition on the import of tuna fish not caught using dolphin-safe technology was not 
adopted by the pre-WTO dispute settlement procedure (which was based on consensus). 
For more information see GATT, supra note 113, art. XXIII. Instead, the U.S. committed 
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conflict; the question being whether or not American consumers have the 
right to know where their food comes from.133 At stake are the echoes of 
protectionism: the struggle between sovereignty and compliance. 
Canada alleges that, as applied, COOL results in less favorable treat-
ment for Canadian beef, pork, and livestock.134 The director of govern-
ment and international relations for the Canadian Cattlemen’s Associa-
tion, John Masswohl, says that both cattle and hog exports have fallen by 
one third since the enactment of the regulation and that COOL unfairly 
discriminates against Canadian producers.135 He says that meat packers 
are refusing to buy Canadian animals instead of taking on the added costs 
of segregating and labeling their livestock supplies.136 The effect of the 
labeling regulation may be particularly hard on Canadian producers be-
cause sixty-five percent of U.S. cattle imports and thirty three percent of 
U.S. beef imports were from Canada in 2008.137 Yet, disparate effects 
alone do not necessarily amount to a violation of WTO obligations. 
The SPS and TBT agreements are two WTO agreements that directly 
bear upon food labeling requirements, although neither considers the 
                                                                                                             
to redesign its legislation. See Paul J. Yechout, In the Wake of New Possibilities for 
GATT-Compliant Environmental Standards, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247, 259 (1996). 
 133. There has been a noticeable shift in WTO decisions. In the Tuna/Dolphin case the 
panel found that the ban could not be justified because the harvesting techniques did not 
affect tuna as a product. See Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, ¶¶ 5.10–5.15, DS21/R-39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991). But now, the WTO is increasingly 
concerned with process and production methods, evidenced by the implementation of the 
TBT and SPS Agreements, which are concerned with safety standards. Under U.S.—
Shrimp/Turtle, the WTO has allowed for restrictions on shrimp imports that do not em-
ploy mechanisms for turtles to escape, as long as the restrictions are not arbitrary and 
unjustifiably discriminatory. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 507–09 (2008). It is 
possible then that moral concerns, like giving consumers the information to make a 
choice about where their meat comes from will have more leverage in the WTO than 
previously assumed. For a discussion of the history and possibility of moral exceptions, 
see Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 689 
(1998). 
 134. Request for Panel, supra note 8. 
 135. Interview with John Masswohl, supra note 61. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Background Statistics: US Beef and Cattle Industry, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. 
RESEARCH SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/news/bsecoverage.htm (last visited Aug. 29,  
2010) [hereinafter US Beef and Cattle Industry]. In total sales, the value of Canadian 
exports of cattle and beef to the US is $2.866 billion (Canadian dollars), but these num-
bers pale in comparison to the total consumption and value of consumption of beef in the 
US market. In 2008, beef imports from Canada accounted for 3.1 percent of total US beef 
consumption tallied at 27.3 billion pounds. Id. 
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consumer’s right to know.138 While both agreements have provisions for 
non-discrimination, consistent application, and assurances that the meas-
ures are not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve a legitimate 
goal, “a measure will not fall under both agreements simultaneously.”139 
Determining which agreement applies is important because the SPS 
Agreement does not have national treatment provisions.140 The TBT 
Agreement does have these provisions and would therefore prohibit cer-
tain forms of trade discrimination that might be permitted under the SPS. 
The following Sections break down the possible analysis a Panel would 
undertake to determine COOL’s compliance with each agreement Cana-
da alleges is violated. A measure will be found to violate a country’s 
WTO obligations if any one element of an applicable agreement is not 
met. As the following analysis shows, COOL complies with most of the 
requirements, but ultimately, the regulation’s survival hinges upon a 
finding of a legitimate objective in order to overcome the infringement it 
causes upon international trade. 
B. Application of the SPS Agreement 
In all likelihood, the WTO Dispute Panel will find that the SPS agree-
ment does not apply to COOL, because the USDA has explicitly stated 
that the regulations are not intended to, and do not, address food safety 
concerns.141 Whether the SPS Agreement is even applicable is a question 
                                                                                                             
 138. See Keane, supra note 85, at 315. 
 139. Michele M. Compton, Applying World Trade Organization Rules to the Labeling 
of Genetically Modified Foods, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 359, 374 (2003); TBT Agreement, 
supra note 93, arts. 1.5, 2; SPS Agreement, supra note 101, art. 5. See also Kevin C. 
Kennedy, Resolving International Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the WTO: 
Lessons and Future Directions, 55 FOOD DRUG L.J. 81, 91 (2000). But see Joanne Scott, 
European Regulations of GMOs and the WTO, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 213, 228–31 (2003) 
(arguing that GMO labeling regulations would fall under the purview of both the SPS and 
TBT Agreements). The EC—Biotech panel dismissed Canada’s argument that some of 
the safeguard measures could be considered under the TBT Agreement in addition to the 
SPS Agreement. The panel said that the measures were entirely SPS measures and were 
not in part covered under the TBT agreement. Panel Report, European Communities—
Measures Affecting the Approval & Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶ 7.3412, 
WT/DS291, 292, 293/R (Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter EC—Biotech]. 
 140. Appleton, supra note 96, at 571. 
 141. See COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2677. The agency explained that 
the intent of the law . . . is to provide consumers with additional information on 
which to base their purchasing decisions. COOL is a retail labeling program 
and as such does not provide a basis for addressing food safety. Food products, 
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of whether COOL is a sanitary or phytosanitary measure that directly or 
indirectly affects international trade.142 The SPS agreement covers meas-
ures intended to protect against risks from diseases, pests, disease caus-
ing or carrying organisms, contaminants, toxins, or additives.143 Unlike 
disputes over hormones given to dairy cows or genetic modification of 
genes in plant life, country-of-origin labels do not directly implicate any 
unknown aspects of science so the SPS agreement may not apply to 
COOL. According to the EC—Biotech Panel, one looks to the objective 
of the measure, its form, and its nature to determine if it is an SPS meas-
ure.144 The USDA claims the measure is intended solely to provide “con-
sumers with additional information about the source of food products and 
to help[] producers differentiate their products.”145 Thus, this marketing 
measure does not have the purpose characteristic of an SPS measure. 
Admittedly, COOL does have the form and nature of an SPS measure 
because the regulation is a mandatory requirement created by an admin-
istrative agency. But, such a finding is irrelevant because it is lacking the 
“purpose to protect” that invokes the SPS Agreement in the first place. 
Should the Panel hold otherwise and seek to determine whether COOL 
fulfills the obligations of the SPS agreement, the U.S. will be hard 
pressed to prove compliance. The SPS agreement relies upon scientific 
evidence to justify the imposition of regulation.146 When relevant scien-
tific evidence is insufficient, a Member may take measures on the basis 
of available and relevant information, drawing on international standards 
and measures applied in other countries.147 The U.S. has not made any 
claims about the relative health and safety of meat from Canada, or any-
where in particular, since it is not a question of insufficiency of scientific 
                                                                                                             
both imported and domestic, must meet the food safety standards of the FDA 
and FSIS. 
Failure to comply with this law will not trigger any recall of meat products, as violations 
of FDA and FSIS food safety standards would. COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2677–78. 
 142. EC—Biotech, supra note 139, ¶ 7.2552. 
 143. See SPS Agreement, supra note 101, at Annex A(1)(a)–(d); Norbert L. W. Wil-
son, Clarifying the Alphabet Soup of the TBT and the SPS in the WTO, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. 
L. 703, 720 (2003). 
 144. EC—Biotech, supra note 139, ¶¶ 7.1333–34. 
 145. Vilsack Letter, supra note 65. 
 146. SPS Agreement, supra note 101, art. 2.2 (“measure is applied to the extent neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant health or life, is based on scientific principles and 
is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence”). See also EC—Biotech, supra 
note 139, ¶ 7.1424. 
 147. SPS Agreement, supra note 101, arts 2.2, 3.1, 5.7. 
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proof. The regulation is not based on science, but rather on the consum-
ers’ right to know where their food is coming from.148 
Article 5.1 requires, when read together with Article 2.2, that results 
from a risk assessment reasonably support the measure based on objec-
tive evaluation.149 The measure should only be adopted after evaluation 
of the risks and likelihoods of adverse effects on human and animal 
health.150 The risks must be ascertainable in order to serve as the basis 
for a restriction on trade.151 Looking at the recent history of imports, the 
proportion of beef and veal imports from Canada parallel the total beef 
and veal consumption in the U.S.152 Cattle imports from Canada dipped 
after 2003 because of a case of mad cow disease but have rebounded 
since.153 It does not seem that the regulations were based on any statistic-
al risk or effort to protect U.S. meat eaters. The U.S. would gain no trac-
tion arguing that the circumstances of food safety concerns elsewhere 
require origin-labeling regulation; there is no apparent relationship be-
tween the mandatory labeling laws and any evidence of risks associated 
with human, animal, or plant health based on where the food originates. 
COOL does not serve as a replacement for food safety standards or tra-
ceability efforts and will not be a substitute for countries that may not 
have as stringent regulations as the U.S.154 Therefore, if the SPS Agree-
ment is applied, COOL will not have met its requirements and the panel 
will find the U.S. to have violated its WTO obligations. 
C. Application of the TBT Agreement 
Given the nature of the regulation, COOL is likely to fall under the 
scrutiny of the TBT Agreement. The TBT Agreement is intended to pro-
tect against unnecessary obstacles to international trade as a result of un-
                                                                                                             
 148. It would be inappropriate to explore the contours of a science-based argument for 
these measures because the rationale would probably be found in Member’s differences 
in standards for control, inspection, and permitted inputs like fertilizers and feedstuffs. 
 149. EC—Hormones, supra note 111, ¶ 189. 
 150. See also Dispute Settlement Commentary on EC—Biotech (2006), 
WORLDTRADELAW.NET, at 74, www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/panel/ec-
biotech(dsc)(panel).pdf. 
 151. Appleton, supra note 96, at 572. 
 152. See USDA Beef and Cattle Industry, supra note 137; Briefing Room—Cattle: 
Trade, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Econ. Research Serv.,  
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Cattle/trade.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter Briefing Room—Cattle: Trade]. 
 153. See USDA Beef and Cattle Industry, supra note 137; Briefing Room—Cattle: 
Trade, supra note 152. 
 154. See COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2679. 
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justifiable or arbitrarily discriminatory technical requirements.155 It ap-
plies to all mandatory provisions that deal with packaging, marking, or 
labeling requirements related to a product’s characteristics, production, 
or processing method.156 A WTO Panel explains, “a document that lays 
down a requirement that a product label must contain a particular detail, 
in fact, lays down a product characteristic.”157 Thus, the mandatory 
COOL requirements, which are not designed for food safety purposes, 
apply to a product’s characteristics as covered by the TBT agreement.158 
The agreement requires any technical regulation to be justified by a le-
gitimate objective.159 One such legitimate objective is the prevention of 
deceptive practices, which may be broad enough to include allowances 
for a consumer’s right to know but has not yet been interpreted by a pan-
el.160 The idea of market transparency, of giving the consumer all of the 
information the retailer knows, has not been questioned in disputes over 
labeling preserved sardines or creating dual retail outlets for imported 
and domestic beef.161 Many nations have origin labeling requirements, 
including the EU,162 which implemented extensive meat labeling regula-
tions in 2000 with the express purpose of “strengthening consumer con-
                                                                                                             
 155. See TBT Agreement, supra note 93, at pmbl. 
 156. See id. at Annex 1.1. 
 157. Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geograph-
ical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, at ¶ 7.451, WT/DS174/R, 
WT/DS290/R (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter EC—Trademarks GI]. 
 158. See TBT Agreement, supra note 93, art. 1.5. The TBT Agreement does not apply 
to sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which according to the definition of such meas-
ures in the SPS Agreement includes those directed at food safety. 
 159. See id. art. 2.2. 
 160. See id. The European Court of Justice held that in order to protect the authenticity 
and quality of a product granted a protected geographic indicator, conditions can be 
placed on the slicing and packaging of the product. Although geographic indicators are a 
trademark issue that falls under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”), and therefore are distinct from country-of-origin, the 
restrictions on the use of the protected label is instructive. The risk of consumers wrong-
fully attributing a product to a particular place could change the value of the product in 
the mind of the consumer. See Case C-108/01 Consorzio del Prosciutto Di Parma v. Asda 
Stores, 2003 E.C.R. I-5121. With country-of-origin labels there is no inherent value in a 
product from Canada versus a product from the U.S., but the consumer might wish to 
exercise his/her purchasing power and have other considerations in mind when deciding 
between ground beef from different sources. See SUPPAN, supra note16. 
 161. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sar-
dines, ¶¶  269–83 WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter EC—Sardines]; Ko-
rea—Beef, supra note 116, ¶¶  133–35 (both measures were found to violate various 
WTO requirements despite having legitimate objectives). 
 162. GAO, COOL, supra note 81, at 24. 
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fidence in beef and [to] avoid misleading them.”163 Although in the past 
the U.S. has resisted implementing labeling regulations on the basis of 
consumer interest alone, Congressional support legitimizes the consum-
er’s right to know as an objective.164  It is possible, at least at this stage 
of the inquiry, that consumer’s right to know the origin of their meat will 
be considered a legitimate objective.165 
If providing consumers with information is a legitimate objective in 
and of itself,166 the measure must still meet a number of other criteria to 
be compliant with the TBT agreement. First, imported products must be 
treated no less favorably than “like products” of domestic origin.167 Al-
though it seems obvious that a rack of lamb from an animal born in the 
U.S. is no different than one born in Canada, it is first necessary to de-
termine what constitutes “like products.” Because so little jurisprudence 
under the TBT agreement exists, determinations made under GATT Ar-
ticle III:4 inform this analysis.168 A “like product” refers to products in a 
competitive relationship.169 The Panel describes four factors to look to 
                                                                                                             
 163. Council Regulation 1760/2000, supra note 82, at 4. 
 164. The WTO is not a self-executing agreement; instead it relies on its Members to 
implement agreements through domestic law. In order to gain legitimacy and effective-
ness, it must have the support of the major nations. Support from major players, like in 
any international setting, is key to moving an agenda forward. In this instance, a policy 
goal may be deemed legitimate simply because it is held by a number of, or at least a 
powerful few, Members. See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World 
Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (discussing the evolution of international trade 
agreements resulting in law rather than resulting from politics). 
 165. The idea of a legitimate objective will be analyzed again under the GATT where I 
will argue that the consumer’s right to know will not be enough to support the infringe-
ment COOL creates upon international trade. 
 166. Although it is unlikely to be a legitimate objective, this Note will consider the rest 
of the elements necessary under the TBT Agreement to show that COOL would other-
wise comply with WTO obligations. For an excellent argument that consumer informa-
tion and, in particular, origin labeling is a legitimate objective, see Letter from Terence P. 
Stewart & Elizabeth J. Drake, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, on behalf of the U.S. 
Cattlemen’s Ass’n & the Nat’l Farmers Union, to Daniel Brinza, Assistant U.S. Trade  
Representative for Monitoring & Enforcement, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
(Jan. 8, 2010), available at regulations.gov (search “Elizabeth Drake”; then follow 
“USTR-2009-0004-0017” hyperlink under ID)). 
 167. TBT Agreement, supra note 93, art. 2.1. 
 168. See Okubo, supra note 15, at 616. Interpretations of similar clauses in the GATT 
will serve as guidance in this Note to determine the scope and meaning of the TBT 
Agreement. 
 169. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 133, at 517–18 n.2 (commenting on the Ap-
pellate Body’s analysis of Article III in EC—Asbestos, supra note 118, ¶¶ 96–98, 99, 
101). 
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when evaluating “like products:” nature and quality of the products, end 
uses of the products, tariff classification of the products, and consumer 
perceptions as indicated by their habits and behavior.170 In the case of 
COOL, it is clear that meat products affected by the labeling require-
ments would meet the first three factors of this test. The quality and na-
ture of the products should be the same, as they all need to follow the 
rules and standards of the FDA and USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (“FSIS”). The end use of muscle cuts and ground meat are for 
consumption in one way or another, no matter their origin.171 The goods 
will be classified according to the appropriate label under the Harmo-
nized Tariff Schedule, where no distinction is made for country of ori-
gin.172 
In spite of this, these products may not be “like” based on consumer 
perceptions and behavior. Consumers cannot differentiate products based 
on origin or processes without additional information, but a number of 
studies have shown that some people are willing to pay more for prod-
ucts based on where they are from.173 People’s perceptions and behavior 
have changed since the recent food scares, and they want to be able to 
choose whether or not to buy meat from countries with food safety prob-
lems.174 To those people, there may not be competition between prod-
ucts. 
                                                                                                             
 170. EC—Asbestos, supra note 118, ¶ 101. 
 171. In EC—Asbestos the panel noted that a prior panel had looked at end uses and 
consumers’ taste as ways of analyzing likeness. Id. ¶ 85. This statement does not mean 
that similar cuts of meat will have the exact same fat to protein ratio, or similar marbling 
patterns. These distinctions are governed under other FDA and USDA regulations and 
grading systems. 
 172. Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, Section I: Live Animals; Ani-
mal Products,  available at http://hts.usitc.gov/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2010), also pub-
lished in looseleaf format. U.S. International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C., 
1987. 
 173. Umberger, Country-of-Origin Labeling, supra note 70. Not to belittle expert taste 
buds, but to the average consumer, a hamburger made from cattle raised in Montana will 
be no different from that made from cattle raised four miles across the border in Canada, 
yet they will pay more for one than the other. See id. (finding people are willing to pay a 
premium for steak labeled as USA Guaranteed born and raised); Jutta Roosen, Jason L. 
Lusk & John A. Fox, Consumer Demand for and Attitudes Toward Alternative Beef 
Labeling Strategies in France, Germany, and the UK, 19 AGRIBUSINESS: AN INT’L J. 77 
(2003) (determining European consumers’ preference of origin indications over other 
product attributes). 
 174. David Kesmodel & Julie Jargon, Labels Will Say If Your Beef Was Born in the 
USA, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, at D1. 
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There is a distinction to be made: given the information, these consum-
ers would exercise their purchasing power to buy a preferred good. This 
is the underlying argument for the consumer’s right to know. But, just 
because a consumer would prefer one type over another does not indicate 
that the products are not “like.” In fact, it probably only boosts the argu-
ment that they are directly competitive.175 On balance, it is likely a Panel 
could justifiably find that the products regulated under COOL are “like.” 
If they are found not “like,” then they may be treated differently, and 
Canada’s claim under the TBT Agreement should fail. Yet, given the 
relative weakness of the consumer perception argument, the next ques-
tion becomes whether COOL discriminates between “like” products. 
Article 2.1 requires that imported products be treated “no less favou-
rabl[y] than . . . like products of national origin.”176 At first glance, 
COOL regulations are facially neutral. All retailers must “notify their 
customers of the country of origin of covered commodities.”177 No dis-
tinction is made between imported or domestic commodities; each must 
have the requisite label. The rules do distinguish between “commodities” 
and “processed food items.” A wide range of foodstuffs are not covered 
by the statute and therefore are excluded from the labeling require-
ments.178 Is this exclusion grounds for finding discrimination within the 
meaning of the TBT agreement? Under the final rule, a “processed food 
item” is “a retail item derived from a covered commodity that has under-
gone specific processing resulting in a change in the character of the 
covered commodity, or that has been combined with at least one other 
covered commodity or other substantive food component.”179 This essen-
                                                                                                             
 175. For example, different colored fresh bell peppers. One may have a preference for 
yellow bell peppers over orange but the tariff classification for both of them is 
0709.60.40 with further classification granted based upon where the peppers are grown, 
not their color. Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, Section II: Vegetable 
Products, United States International Trade Commission, available at http://hts.usitc.gov/ 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2010), also published in looseleaf format. U.S. International Trade 
Commission. Washington, D.C., 1987. 
 176. TBT Agreement, supra note 93, art 2.1. 
 177. COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2658. 
 178. Id. at 2660. 
 179. 7 C.F.R. § 65.220. The rule carves out those foods that have added components 
such as water, salt, or sugar, “that enhances or represents a further step in the preparation 
of the product for consumption.” It gives an incomplete list of processing methods that 
would result in a change of character “includ[ing] cooking (e.g., frying, broiling, grilling, 
boiling, steaming, baking, roasting), curing (e.g., salt curing, sugar curing, drying), smok-
ing (hot or cold), and restructuring (e.g., emulsifying and extruding).” Id. In the summary 
of changes from the interim rule, to the final rule the USDA gives examples of what 
would be included and excluded as follows: 
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tially means that bacon need not be labeled while ham does, and beef 
patty mix need not be labeled while hamburger does.180 A consumer who 
looks at the origin label on a hamburger would also care to know the ori-
gin of beef patty mix.181 However, according to COOL, if in fact these 
products are different, requiring labels on one but not the other is not 
discriminatory since they are not like products and can, thus, be treated 
differently. COOL’s exception for processed food items, although harm-
ful to the legitimate objective argument, does not create a violation of the 
TBT Agreement as long as a Panel agrees that they are not like products. 
Canada alleges that COOL is applied in a manner that results in less 
favorable treatment to beef, pork, and livestock from Canada than that 
from the U.S.,182 evidenced by a precipitous drop in exports since the 
measure went into effect.183 Once again: 
a detrimental effect on a given imported product resulting from a meas-
ure does not necessarily imply that this measure accords less favourable 
treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is explained by factors or 
circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product, such as the 
market share of the importer.184 
                                                                                                             
As examples of processing steps that are considered to further prepare product 
for consumption, meat products that have been needle-tenderized or chemically 
tenderized using papain or other similar additive are not considered processed 
food items. Likewise, meat products that have been injected with sodium phos-
phate or other similar solution are also not considered processed food items as 
the solution has not changed the character of the covered commodity. In con-
trast, meat products that have been marinated with a particular flavor such as 
lemon-pepper, Cajun, etc. have been changed in character and thus are consi-
dered processed food items. 
COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2660–61. 
 180. See COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. at 2666. Ham must be labeled unless it has been cured, 
and beef patty mix is not a covered commodity because it likely includes a number of 
binders and extenders that the USDA believes will be too costly and burdensome to se-
gregate and identify. 
 181. Ground beef marketed as hamburger is allowed to have added fat, whereas beef 
patty mix may contain beef heart meat and tongue meat. The USDA “believes that the 
costs associated with this segregation and identification” of variety meats is overly bur-
densome and thus are not included as covered commodities. Id. 
 182. See Request for Panel, supra note 8. 
 183. The Canadian Cattlemen’s Association says that cattle and hog exports to the U.S. 
have fallen by one-third since the measure went into effect. See Interview with John 
Masswohl, supra note 61. 
 184. Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting the Importa-
tion and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, ¶ 96 WT/DS302/AB/R (May 19, 2005). 
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The Canadian Cattlemen’s Association said the decrease in Canadian 
meat imports to the U.S. is because of the costs associated with separat-
ing and labeling meat from different sources.185 However, since the 
measure requires labels on all meat no matter the source, it seems Cana-
da is complaining about a shift in U.S. consumer demand, rather than any 
shift in producer’s supply. 
Beef imports from all sources increased by 12.5 percent comparing a 
six-month period in 2008 to the same period in 2009.186 In that time-
frame, imports from Canada dropped by 2.84 percent.187 If the issue were 
cost disparity to packers who must segregate and label supplies, one 
would expect a unilateral drop in imports, but the evidence shows other-
wise. Yet, there is no reason to believe it costs packers any more to se-
gregate and label beef from Canada than it does beef from Australia or 
New Zealand. The disparate impact on Canadian imports seems to be an 
expression of consumer preference rather than discriminatory effects. As 
such, the WTO could find that imported products are not treated any less 
favorably than domestic products, and thus, COOL does not violate the 
TBT Agreement on this account. 
Under Article 2.2, the TBT Agreement requires three things. First, 
COOL may not be, or create the effect of, an unnecessary obstacle to 
trade.188 Second, it must be the least restrictive measure possible to 
achieve the desired effect.189 Finally, it must fulfill a legitimate objec-
tive.190 These items are cumulative; if the measure does not meet any one 
of these obligations it will be inconsistent with the obligations of the 
agreement. 
The TBT Agreement allows for measures that encroach upon trade as 
long as they are the least restrictive measures possible to achieve a legi-
timate purpose.191 The stated objective, to provide consumers with in-
formation about the origin of the food they are buying, is probably not 
enough to justify the labeling requirements.192 Still, if the Panel finds 
                                                                                                             
 185. Interview with John Masswohl, supra note 61. 
 186. Rob Cook, US Beef Imports by Country (2008 vs. 2009), CATTLE NETWORK (July 
30, 2009), http://www.cattlenetwork.com/U-S—Beef-Imports-By-Country—2008-vs—
2009/2009-07-30/Article.aspx?oid=481339. 
 187. Id. 
 188. TBT Agreement, supra note 93, art 2.2. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See supra notes 72–82 and accompanying text; Degnan, supra note 77. 
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otherwise, labeling is the most effective means of providing the informa-
tion to consumers. 
The complaining party, Canada, likely has the burden of proving there 
are less restrictive measures available to achieve the same objectives.193 
Canada has suggested linking the label requirements to where the prod-
uct takes on the form in which it will be consumed, rather than citing 
where it was born, raised, and slaughtered.194 Canada’s food labeling 
rules follow that theory, requiring the label only to mention the place 
where the food was last processed.195 This method is based on the prin-
cipal of substantial transformation, which refers to the place where the 
item acquired its name, character, or use.196 
While using this standard of determining origin would bring the regu-
lation in line with the existing U.S. marking and classification rules for 
things like optical fiber connectors and toner cartridges, it contravenes 
the purpose and intent of COOL.197 Since 1938, the U.S. has required 
labels to include information about ingredients, weight of the food, shelf 
life, and the name and address of the manufacturer.198 Customs regula-
tion requires most imports to be marked with the country of origin, as 
discussed above.199 But COOL was not intended to restate what these 
rules already require; it was intended to go a step beyond and provide 
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consumers with information on the source of the food they purchase.200 
Labeling origin only as the last place of substantial transformation would 
not be an adequate means of transferring information to the consumer. 
With this suggested method, Canada would not be able to make a case 
that there are less restrictive alternatives to COOL since it would not ac-
complish the stated goal. 
The U.S. must show that the legitimate objective it seeks to address is 
serious enough that a voluntary program is not enough to correct the 
problem.201 Manufacturers may resist voluntary labels, because they give 
competitors an opportunity to use misleading labels.202 After COOL was 
first enacted into legislation in 2002, labeling was voluntary, but few 
processors and packers elected to participate.203 Besides, consumers do 
not have much trust in voluntary country-of-origin information and pre-
fer mandatory labeling.204 Despite the success of voluntary certification 
programs for some food products, voluntary COOL would not be an ade-
quate alternative to fulfill its desired purpose in the eyes of consumers.205 
Voluntary measures would be a reasonable alternative to provide more 
information to consumers only if mandatory COOL fails to show a legi-
timate objective. 
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The TBT Agreement requires that where “relevant international stan-
dards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them” to 
craft their technical regulations.206 When measures are inconsistent with 
international standards, it offends the spirit and purpose of the WTO to 
harmonize and facilitate trade.207 Canada asserts that the Codex General 
Standard for the Labelling of Prepackaged Foods provides a relevant 
international standard for measures like COOL.208 The Codex requires 
country-of-origin labels on prepackaged food;209 there are no require-
ments therein for unprocessed, non-packaged food, such as the meat 
products covered by COOL. In fact, no international standard exists re-
garding the products under COOL. Thus, while COOL must be constant-
ly revisited to ensure compliance with any new standards that may be 
adopted, it is not inherently inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement. Nevertheless, even if the U.S. can show compliance with one 
or more elements of the TBT Agreement, COOL must comply with 
every element and therefore the measure will still be found inconsistent 
if the consumer’s right to know is not a legitimate objective. 
D. Application of the GATT Agreement 
Where applicable, the TBT Agreement is the preferred standard of as-
sessing a measure because of its specificity, whereas the GATT only sets 
forth general obligations.210 This Section will only address those issues 
not otherwise covered under the TBT Agreement. 
Canada alleges that COOL does not minimize the “difficulties and in-
conveniences” the regulation causes and, therefore, is inconsistent with 
the requirements of GATT Article IX:2.211 Although there is no jurispru-
dence to help distinguish the scope of this requirement, it is likely that it 
will be the complaining party’s burden to show that there are alternatives 
that would reduce the burdens imposed by the measure. There are al-
ready a number of other labels applied to these commodities, so it may 
not be an intolerable burden to add the product origin.212 If no alterna-
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tives are proven that could further minimize the difficulties and inconve-
niences, the measure will be in compliance with the requirements of 
GATT Article IX:2. 
Canada alleges that COOL violates the requirements of GATT Article 
IX:4 by “materially reduc[ing] the value of imported livestock.”213 As-
serting compliance with this measure will depend upon the interpretation 
of “materially.” Using the Vienna Convention to interpret the term, the 
first step is to look to its ordinary meaning.214 The dictionary meaning of 
“materially” is substantial effect, meaning that the reduction in value that 
COOL causes must be a significant proportion of the value of the 
good.215 
COOL will affect the entire supply chain, because information will 
need to be maintained and transferred throughout.216 Packers have a 
number of options to obtain origin information on livestock already in 
place, limiting the burden upon them.217 The cost of implementation and 
compliance with COOL will be absorbed by the entire supply chain, hit-
ting intermediaries and retailers the hardest.218 Only a small part of the 
cost will be passed on to consumers.219 Cost of the regulation to produc-
ers is estimated to be $9 per head of cattle and $1 per hog.220 These esti-
mates are industry-wide, and there is no showing that the costs will affect 
Canadian livestock differently than livestock from any other origin ex-
cept with regard to whatever choices consumers may make armed with 
the power to discern the origin of their meat.221 Though these figures 
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suggest no violation of Article IX:4, ultimately the determination will be 
based on the economic evidence the parties submit, and that information 
is not available at the time of this writing.222 
The GATT does provide a small window through narrow exceptions in 
Article XX for measures that do not otherwise comply with its obliga-
tions. It is through these exceptions that the U.S. could hope to prove 
COOL meets the legitimate objective requirements of the TBT Agree-
ment. The relevant provisions to “save” COOL are found in Article 
XX(d). This Article authorizes governments to apply otherwise illegal 
measures when “necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, includ-
ing those relating to . . . the prevention of deceptive practices.”223 Once a 
specific provision is found, the measure must be “further appraised . . . 
under the introductory clauses of Art. XX.”224 
In Korea—Beef, the Panel held the dual retail system for domestic and 
imported beef secured compliance with legislation against deceptive 
practices and, thus, deterred butchers from “misrepresent[ing] less ex-
pensive foreign beef for more expensive domestic beef.”225 Likewise, a 
Panel could find COOL secured compliance with legislation to inform 
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consumers of the origin of their food purchases, encouraging producers 
to maintain records and separate processing lines. 
Whether a measure is necessary to secure compliance is not so narrow-
ly defined as that which is “indispensible or absolutely necessary.”226 
There is a whole range of what can be considered necessary from “indis-
pensible” to that which “makes a contribution to” securing com-
pliance.227 It is up to the Member to decide what it considers necessary, 
but it is up to the Panel to weigh the degree to which the measure contri-
butes to the goal and the degree to which it restricts trade.228 The Panel 
generally looks to see if there is an alternative measure that has less trade 
restrictive effects.229 The U.S. has a strong case that COOL is necessary 
to convey origin information to consumers, given the conspicuous lack 
of data showing labeling was widely adopted during the seven year pe-
riod when COOL was still voluntary.230 
Although the measure can be provisionally justified through Article 
XX(d), it must still meet the procedural requirements stated in the intro-
ductory clauses, or the “chapeau,” of the Article: a measure may “not 
[be] applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination . . . or a disguised restriction on international 
trade.”231 The “chapeau,” is intended to reign in measures that are provi-
sionally justified to ensure that, in effect, they are not any more trade 
restrictive than absolutely necessary.232 
COOL does not create unjustifiable discrimination; it holds imports 
from all Members where the same conditions prevail to the same labeling 
requirements. The numerous changes from the initial rule to the final rule 
reflect information gleaned from consultations between the USDA and 
various affected parties.233 Essentially, through consultations, the USDA 
showed a good faith effort to create a measure in compliance with WTO 
obligations.234 
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In application, COOL may result in arbitrary discrimination. The regu-
lation creates numerous exceptions to labeling requirements for 
processed foods and food service establishments and allows for mixed 
origin labels.235 These exceptions are so broad that they undermine the 
goal of the regulation. The information will be displayed on such limited 
types of consumer goods that consumers will not know when to look for 
it or not. Such uneven application allocates the burden of labeling in a 
way that may seem arbitrary. 
Finally, it may be difficult for the U.S. to disprove that the measure is a 
disguised restriction on international trade. At its core, COOL is a mar-
keting act, enabling producers to capture a higher price for goods labeled 
“product of the U.S.” Despite an obvious desire to support U.S. produc-
ers, COOL does not make any effort to treat imported or domestic goods 
differently. Marketing interests do not restrict international trade. Rather, 
Canada will claim that the decrease in Canadian imports to the U.S. is 
evidence enough of restrictive effects.236 Should the Panel find COOL to 
be arbitrary or unjustified discrimination, or a disguised restriction on 
trade, Article XX will not excuse COOL from WTO obligations. 
V. CONCLUSION: OUTCOMES & ALTERNATIVES 
COOL has the support of the people, the USDA, and the current ad-
ministration; it is a shame that it has to come under the scrutiny of the 
WTO. The DSU Panel’s inquiry will hinge on whether the consumers’ 
right to know can justify COOL’s imposition on international trade.237 
Given the limited success of GATT Article XX exceptions thus far, the 
U.S. Trade Representative ought to re-double efforts to make assurances 
to Canada that trade will resume its normal flows as soon as processors 
adjust to the separation and tracking systems necessary to uphold the spi-
rit of the measure. Should the U.S. fail to convince Canada (and the Pan-
el) otherwise, the Panel will likely find COOL violates the TBT Agree-
ment and GATT obligations requiring measures not be any more trade 
restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective. 
While a Member gets to decide the level of protection it wants, it is up 
to the Panel to determine what degree of enforcement is necessary to 
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meet the desired goal.238 For instance, France was able to say they 
wanted absolute protection from the health hazards of exposure to asbes-
tos, but it was still up to the Panel to determine if this goal warranted an 
absolute ban.239 Perhaps more analogous to the case at hand is that of 
Korea—Beef, where the dual retail system for domestic and imported 
beef was found to violate WTO obligations. The Panel looked at numer-
ous other instances of misrepresentation in the markets for pork and sea-
food, as well as an exemption from separating restaurants that serve im-
ported and domestic beef, and found it was unfair to restrict trade in one 
market when the same problems plagued other markets as well.240 COOL 
creates exemptions for processed foods and food service, despite con-
sumer desire to know the origin of meat in any situation. These inconsis-
tencies weaken the validity of the measure. 
Upon a finding of a violation, the U.S. has a number of options it may 
choose to pursue. The U.S. can simply ignore the Panel’s finding. Since 
decisions by the Panel have no effect on domestic law, it will take politi-
cal will to make changes. But ignoring the decision hurts the strength of 
the WTO and the reputation of the U.S. as a part of the global trade 
community. Moreover, if the U.S. fails to take action, Canada can reta-
liate with the authorization of the WTO.241 Acknowledging the violation 
and switching to a voluntary system might better serve the U.S. By the 
time the Panel makes its report, the labeling system will already have 
been in place for some time. The upfront costs will already be fully in-
vested, and consumers will have grown accustomed to having origin la-
bels. Therefore, it would be in producers’ best interest to keep up with 
consumer confidence and maintain voluntary labeling practices. 
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